Social Choice Theory, Auction Theory.

• Fair Consumption with Negative Externality (with Manipushpak Mitra and Soumendu Sarkar).


• Learning From The Past Experiments on the Dictator and the Ultimatum Game (with Sanmitra Ghosh and Shubhro Sarkar).

• Expanding and Confusing Space of Alternatives: a case for Lexicographic Preferences (with Manipushpak Mitra and Debapriya Sen), Journal of Mathematical Psychology, forthcoming.
• Non-dictatorial public distribution rules, Review of Economic Design, forthcoming


• A characterization of lexicographic preferences, (with Manipushpak Mitra and Debapriya Sen) Decision Analysis, forthcoming


• Common-Value All-Pay Auctions with Asymmetric Information, (with Ezra Einy, Ori Haimanko, Ram Orzach, Aner Sela), International Journal of Game Theory 2017, 46, 1, pages: 79-102.


• Rational Bidding in a Procurement Auction with Subjective Evaluations, (with David Wettstein), International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2016, 44, pages: 60-67.


• A Hurwicz type result in a model with public good production, (with Arunava Sen and Sonal Yadav), Social Choice and Welfare 2015, 45(4), pages: 867-887.


• Non fixed-price trading rules in single-crossing classical exchange economies, Social Choice and Welfare, 2015, 44, pages: 389-422.


• Strategy proofness and Pareto efficiency in quasi-linear exchange economies (with Manipushpak Mitra and Arunava Sen) Theoretical Economics, 2014, 9, pages: 361-381.


• Quality cut-offs in procurement auctions, Economics Letters, 2013, 121, pages: 148-151.

Ph.D.(Quantitative Economics) Indian Statistical Institute, 2012.